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Unemployment Insurance, Duration of
Unemployment, and Subsequent
Wage Gain
By RONALD G. EHRENBERG AND RONALD L. OAXACA*
Recent debate over potential methods
to reduce the unemployment rate has
stressed the impact of the unemployment
insurance (UI) system, arguing that liberal
benefit levels tend to increase the level of
unemployment.^ That the system may
have this effect in the short run should not
be surprising in that an explicit objective
of the UI system is to provide temporary
income rnaintenance for unemployed work-
ers, so as to allow them to reject job offers
substantially below their skill levels and
to engage in productive job search.^ Indeed
all formal analytic models of job search
imply that increases in UI benefit levels
will both increase unemployed workers'
expected durations of unemployment and
their expected postunemployment wages.'
Consequently, any discussion of the ap-
propriate level of UI benefits must con-
sider this intertemporal tradeoff and evalu-
ate whether the cost to society of increased
durations of spells of unemployment when
UI benefits are raised is more than off-
* Associate professor of economics and labor eco-
nomics, Cornell University, and associate professor of
economics. University of Arizona. This paper sum-
marizes the results of research supported under U.S.
Department of Labor Contract L74-49, however the
views expressed here are solely the responsibility of
the authors. We are deeply indebted to Edward Karl
for his research assistance during the course of the
study. An earlier version of this paper was delivered
at the Third World Congress of the Econometric
Society.
*See for example, Martin Feldstein (t973).
'See William Haber and Merrill Murray, pp. 26-3S.
'See for example, Dale Mortensen. Kenneth Bur-
dett surveys these theories and emphasizes the
importance of each of the various assumptions cus-
tomarily made in models of this type.
set by the increases in expected post-
unemployment wages.
In order to evaluate what the "optimal"
level of UI benefits is, one must therefore
first estimate the magnitude of the rela-
tionships between UI benefits levels and
unemployed workers' durations of unem-
ployment and postunemployment wages.
There have been several previous studies
of the impact of UI benefits on duration of
spells of unemployment, however none
have been completely satisfactory meth-
odologically.^ To our knowledge, there
have been no previous studies of the sys-
tem's impact on subsequent wage rates.^
We attempt to fill these gaps, utilizing
data from the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey (NLS) to estimate both relationships.
The plan of our pjaper is as follows. First,
we sketch the implications of theories of
job search for our estimating equations.
Next, we briefly discuss the NLS data.
The following four sections summarize the
empirical results we have obtained for four
cohorts of data: older males, ages 45-59;
women, ages 30-44; and younger males
* Many of these studies are enumerated in Ehren-
berg (1974). By far the best appears to be by Ronald
Schmidt, who is concerned primarily with testing the
implications of search theory rather than with esti-
mating the impact of UI benefits. Stephen Marston
presents an approach which is quite different from
that found in most of the studies, including our own.
'Kathleen Classen has attempted to estimate the
system's impact on workers' annual and high quarter
earnings, using data from the Continuous Wage and
Benefit History File for Pennsylvania. Unfortunately,
this data base has numerous weaknesses as compared
to the NLS data used in this study (see Ehrenberg,
1975).
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and females, ages 14-24. Finally, we con-
sider the implications of our results for
public policy. Due to space limitations our
discussion here is necessarily brief and de-
tails of our research are found elsewhere.^
I. Implications of Theories of Job Search
Numerous models of unemployed work-
ers' job search under imperfect informa-
tion have been developed during the past
few years. While the specific form of the
solution to the individual's decision prob-
lem depends on the specific assumptions
made, the implications of these models for
unemployed workers' expected durations
of spells of unemployment {E{D)) and ex-
pected postunemployment wages {E{W))
are fairly robust and appear to be invari-
ant to many of the assumptions. These
implications include:
(i) Anything that reduces the cost of
being unemployed (c) will increase an in-
dividual's expected duration of unemploy-
ment and expected postunemployment
wage.
(ii) Anything that decreases an in-
dividual's horizon («) will decrease his
expected duration of spell and post-
unemployment wage.
(iii) Anything that influences an in-
dividual's skill level (s) will increase his
expected postunemployment wage but
may have an ambiguous effect on expected
duration.^
(iv) Anything that increases the. in-
dividual's discount rate (r) will reduce his
search and lead to a decrease in both his
expected duration of spell and post-
unemployment wage.
(v) Anything that influences the dis-
tribution of potential wage offers (d) that
an unemployed individual faces will in-
°See Ehrenberg (1974) and the authors.
' Heuristically, this ambiguity occurs because in-
creasing an individual's skill level increases the pro-
portion of jobs for which he is eligible and also
induces him to reject a greater proportion of low
wage offers.
fluence his expected postunemployment
wage and duration of spell.
Thus, models of job search under imper-
fect information suggest a two-equation
model of the determinants of an individu-
al's expected duration of unemployment
and postunemployment wage of the form
(1) E{D) = fic,n,s,r,d)
(2) E{W) = g{c,n,s,r,d)
Two comments should be made about
this system of equations. First, as indi-
cated in an appendix which is available
from us on request, if rigorously apphed,
the theory implies not only qualitative im-
plications about the partial derivatives in
(1) and (2) but also cross-equation restric-
tions on both their functional forms and
the magnitudes of corresponding coeffi-
cients in the two equations. Second, as
Feldstein has emphasized, in estimating
the cost of remaining unemployed, the in-
dividual should rationally compare UI
benefit payments to net after-tax potential
earnings.* This occurs because UI benefits
are not taxable, while federal and state
income taxes and social security taxes
must be paid on labor earnings. Conse-
quently, the cost of remaining unemployed
is given by
(3) C = Wpil - I) — Bk
where Wp is the individual's potential
weekly earnings, t is his marginal tax rate,
B is his weekly UI benefit level, and ^ is a
parameter that varies across individuals
which, if greater than one, indicates that
the individual is receiving supplementary
unemployment benefits from private
sources.
Fmpirically, due to data limitations, we
are forced to assume that Wp equals the
preunemployment weekly wage and that
"See Feldstein (1973). Presumably all work-related
expenses should also be subtracted from potential
earnings in this calculation.
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k equals unity for all individuals.' Then
(3) can be written
(30 C = W^{i - t)[l - F/(l - 0)]
where F is the replacement fraction, the
ratio of an individual's weekly UI benefits
to his preunemployment weekly wage.
This variable is a policy instrument and
varies across individuals due to the liberal-
ity of various state plans, the level of the
individuals' previous earnings, and their
number of dependents. Our empirical work
focuses on estimating the impact of this
variable on unemployed workers' expected
durations of unemployment and post-
unemployment wages.
II. The National Longitudinal Survey
(NLS) Data
Our empirical analysis utilizes data con-
tained in the NLS sample. The survey
was conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census for the Manpower Administration,
and the data files are currently distributed
by the Center for Human Resource Re-
search at Ohio State University. This
longitudinal survey contains a wealth of
information relating to the labor force be-
havior of four cohorts of 5000 individuals
each: older males, ages 45-59; women, ages
30-44; and young males and females, ages
14-24 at their initial survey dates.^"
Although the state that each individual
is located in is not explicitly reported in
the public use version of the NLS tapes,
it proved possible for us to infer each indi-
vidual's state of residence from other
information which was provided. This
allowed us to estimate each unemployed
individual's state and federal marginal in-
come tax rate, and his marginal social
"A discussion of how these assumptions bias our
coefficient estimates is found in Ehrenberg (1974).
"See the Center for Human Resource Research
and Herbert Pames for a description of the survey.
The strengths and weaknesses of this data set for UI
research are described in detail in Ehrenberg (t97S).
security tax rate.'^ In addition, it allowed
us to merge additional data relating to
specific state unemployment insurance
systems with each individual's record. At
points in our empirical work, we were thus
able to estimate the impact of such state
UI system parameters as the maximum
duration of weeks of benefit payments, the
length of the waiting period before benefits
start, the denial rate and the coverage rate
on unemployed individuals' job search
behavior.
III. Empirical Results—Older Males
Our initial analysis was conducted using
the older male data. At the time our study
was started, annual surveys for this cohort
had been conducted and were available for
the 1966-69 period. However, the 1968
survey was an abbreviated mail one which
did not contain information on wage rates
or numbers of spells of unemployment. In
order to estimate both the postunemploy-
ment wage and average duration of un-
employment equations with as little mea-
surement error as possible in the explana-
tory variables, we confined our analysis to
data from the 1966 and 1967 surveys. We
utilized a sample of 274 men who a) were
employed wage and salary workers and re-
ported their wage rates at both dates, b)
were unemployed sometime during the
interim, and c) reported their number of
spells and whether they received un-
employment insurance benefits during the
period.^^ This sample was further strati-
fied, and separate equations estimated for
individuals who were voluntarily un-
"See Ehrenberg (1974) for a description of our
methodology.
"Da ta from the 1968 and 1969 surveys could have
been used in an analogous manner if we were willing
to use the 1967 wage as a proxy for the 1968 wage
in the duration and wage gain equations. Although
we have subsequently made similar imputations (see
below) for the female cohort to increase the sample
size, we attempted in our initial analysis to keep the
data as free of measurement error as possible.
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employed, who were on temporary layoff
and returned to their employer, who were
laid off and switched employers, and whose
reason for unemployment could not be
ascertained.^'
Our estimating equations are of the
form"
k
(4a) ln{D) = ao + a^F + Y. «)«y
(4b)
;=2
where D is our estimate of the individual's
average duration of spell, Wa(Wee) is the
individual's wage at the 1967 (1966) sur-
vey date, and the x, are variables which
serve as proxies for those variables other
than F which enter into (1) and (2). Given
the small sample sizes and the need to
avoid severe collinearity problems, only a
small number of these variables could be
entered into the analysis. Since they serve
primarily as controls, the omission of col-
linear Xj variables should not bias our esti-
mates of the F coefficients. For brevity, we
do not discuss the coefficients of these con-
trol variables here.^^
Note that these initial estimates do not
correct for varying marginal tax rates
across individuals, do not include any
other UI system parameters in the analy-
sis, and enter F in its level form rather
than as in (3'). The first two points will be
discussed shortly. With respect to the lat-
ter, estimation with F entered as in (3')
yielded results which were marginally
worse than those reported below.'^
""Reason for unemployment" is defined without
error only for those individuals who experienced a
single spell of unemployment during the period.
"The functional forms of these equations are con-
sistent with the specific model presented in an ap-
pendix available upon request to the authors. Also,
the dependent variable in the wage gain equations for
older males is actually 100 x ln{We,/Wm).
'°See the authors.
'"Several people have expressed concern to us about
the potential simultaneity problem which may have
To summarize the results briefly, most
strikingly, UI benefit levels appear to in-
fluence the expected duration of spell and
postunemployment wages only for the
class of workers who were laid off and
changed employers. Estimates of (4a) and
(4b) for these individuals are found in
Table 1. The magnitude of the relation-
ship between F and the dependent vari-
ables does not vary substantially with the
number of spells of unemployment which
an individual had. Ceteris paribus, an in-
crease in the replacement ratio (F) of .1,
from .4 to .5, would increase an individual's
(with one spell of unemployment) post-
unemployment wage by 7.0 percent and
his expected duration of unemployment by
about 1.5 weeks.*' Consequently, over the
range of sample observations for this sub-
group of unemployed individuals, raising
UI benefits marginally would seem to lead
to increased productive job search.
been brushed aside by our treating UI benefits (and
hence F) as exogenous. Specifically, they argue that
since state benefit levels may be correlated with his-
torical differentials in state unemployment rates, with
historically high unemployment rates causing high
benefit levels rather than vice versa, findings based
upon cross-section estimates could be biased. Such
concern is entirely appropriate and points out a major
weakness of studies such as the one by Gene Chapin
which use average statewide data on unemployment
rates or duration of unemployment as dependent
variables. However, since our dependent variable in
(1) is duration of spell for an individual and F
varies across individuals within a state (as well as
across states), the potential simultaneity problem is
unlikely to influence our work significantly.
" An appendix, available from the authors on re-
quest, derives that the estimated percentage wage and
duration of unemployment (in weeks) impacts are
respectively given by
- 1]
and
where di and ^ are the estimated coefficients of F
in (4a) and (4b), D is the geometric mean of dura-
tion of unemployment in the sample, and F is the
mean value of the replacement fraction in the sample.
Since many individuals in the sample receive no
benefits, F will be considerably less than .5.
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TABLE 1—NLS OLDER MALE SAMPLE: LAYOFF/CHANGE EMPLOYERS
(Absolute /-statistics)
F
RACE
MARRIE
OWN
DEPEND
ASSDUM
nORIZN
PSURAT
PSUPOP
ASSETS
WAGE66
EXOINC
TENURE
Constant
R^
n
1
D
1.653
(2.6)
.099
(0.3)
.097
(0.2)
.259
(0.8)
-.013
(0.2)
- .616
(1.6)
.013
(0.5)
.076
(1.0)
- .250 '
(2.0)
.007"
(0.8)
.054
(0.4)
.706"
(1.6)
1.078
(1.4)
.360
39
Spell
W
67.831
(3.6)
-3.255
(0.3)
8.910
(0.6)
-1.695
(0.2)
0.010
(0.0)
6.463
(0.6)
1.556
(1.8)
-2.335
(1.0)
-0.002
(0.6)
.193"
(0.7)
-10.389
(2.8)
-0.005
(0.3)
0.089
(0.2)
2.442
(1.1)
0.551
39
l-h2
D
1.393
(2.3)
.372
(1.2)
.055
(0.1)
.255
(0.9)
- . 0 1 7
(0.3)
- . 6 9 6
(1.9)
- . 0 0 3
(0.1)
.093
(1.4)
- . 2 1 0 "
(1.8)
.009
(1.1)
- . 0 4 7
(0.4)
.210
(0.7)
1.262
(1.8)
.320
51
SpeUs •
W
61.717
(3.4)
1.695
(0.2)
- 0 . 5 0 2
(0.0)
2.592
(0.3)
- 0 . 9 4 8
(0.5)
7.447
(0.7)
1.766
(2.3)
- 2 . 1 6 5
(1.1)
- 0 . 0 0 3
(0.9)
.049"
(0.2)
-12 .805
(4.1)
- 0 . 0 0 3
(0.3)
- 0 . 0 3 2
(0.1)
15.653
(0.8)
.506
51
All
D
1.110
(2.0)
.230
(1.3)
.316
(0.9)
- . 0 1 4
(0.1)
.012
(0.2)
- . 3 9 7
(1.4)
.006
(0.3)
.151
(2.4)
- . 0 5 4 "
(0.6)
.012"
(1.5)
- . 0 7 1
(0.8)
.372
(1.2)
0.598
(1.1)
.240
67
Spells
W
44.168
(2.5)
- 0 . 1 4 6
(0.0)
- 1 . 1 8 9
(0.1)
3.965
(0.5)
0.356
(0.2)
- 4 . 4 7 0
(0.5)
1.280
(1.8)
-3 .367
(1.7)
- 0 . 0 0 2
(0.8)
.015"
(0.0)
- 7 . 2 1 9
(2.7)
- 0 . 0 0 5
(0.5)
0.191
(0.5)
22.494
(1.3)
.313
67
" Variable/1000
Note: D = duration equation
W = wage change equation
F — weekly UI benefits/weekly preunemployment wage
RACE = 1 = white; O=nonwhite
MARRIE = l = married, spouse present; O=other
OWN = l = home owner; O=renter
DEPEND = number of dependents, excluding wife
ASSDVM = 1 = report net assets; O=other
HORIZN = expected number of years to retirement (65 minus age if not reported)
PSURAT = 1966 local area unemployment rate
PSUPOP = 1960 size of local area population
ASSETS = family net assets
WAGE66 = logarithm of the 1966 survey date hourly wage
EXOINC — nonlabor related income (interest, dividends, etC;)
TENURE = number of years employed with the same employer prior to the spell of unemployment
ACE = age in years
HEALTH = l = health limits kind or amount of work; 0=other
EDUC = years of school completed
KNOWRK = rating on "knowledge of work world" questions
67-68 = 1 =spell of unemployment in 1967-68; O=other
68-69 = 1 = spell of unemployment in 1968-69; 0 = other
69-71 = 1 = spell of unemployment in 1969-71; 0=other
LPRWGE = logarithm of preunemployment hourly wage
FEMDEM = index of demand for female labor
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RELLFP = fraction of years since high school in the labor force
RELDUM = l = not report i?£iifP;0=other
PERCPY = per capita family income, excluding the respondent's income
NREP Y = 1 = not report PERCP F; 0 = other
HUSBY = husband's income
NASSDM = l = not report net assets; O = other
Several extensions of this analysis war-
rant being reported here.^ * First, the mag-
nitudes of the replacement ratio coeffi-
cients are fairly insensitive to the specific
(if any) control variables included and the
exclusion of individuals with zero UI bene-
fits from the sample. Second, adjusting the
data for marginal tax rates, which varied
across individuals, altered the results only
slightly and did not significantly change
the quantitative impacts of UI benefits on
job search. Finally, including the other UI
system parameters in the niodel did not
significantly improve the explanatory
power of the model nor did any of these
coefficients prove to be statistically signifi-
cant. We caution, however, that the fact
that the coefficient of the maximum num-
ber of weeks of potential duration of bene-
fits is insignificant sheds no light on the
effect on expected duration of unemploy-
ment of the Federal Extended Benefit and
Supplementary Benefit Programs which
raised the potential duration (in early
1976) to 65 weeks. The individuals in our
sample of older men all tended to have ex-
tremely short spells of unemployment and
the proportion of individuals exhausting
benefits is much higher today.
IV. Empirical Results—Women
Annual surveys for the cohort of women
ages 30-44 in 1967 were available to us for
1967 (with retrospective information for
1966), 1968 (mail survey), 1969, and 1971.
We divided these data into three periods:
1966-67, 1968-69, and 1969-71. An indi-
vidual was included in our sample for a
period if she a) was an employed wage and
"See Ehrenberg (1974).
salary worker and reported her wage at
both survey dates, b) was unemployed
some time during the interim, and c) re-
ported her number of spells of unemploy-
ment. The three samples were then pooled
together to create one overall sample of
441 individuals. Due to errors in our mea-
surement of the 1966 wage, it was impossi-
ble for us to estimate a wage gain equation
for the 1966-67 sample and that period's
data also did not permit us to identify
whether or not the individual had changed
employers. Consequently, we created two
other samples of individuals: all who fell
in the 1968-69 and 1969-71 samples (253)
and those who changed employers and fell
in these samples (156)."
Equations similar to (4a) and (4b) were
estimated for these three samples, with the
dependent variable in (4b) being the log-
arithm of the ratio of the wage rates at the
two survey dates. The results are presented
in Table 2.^ The control variables included
in the analysis are different from those in
the previous section because of the differ-
ent nature of the two samples and the
larger number of observations available
here.
Similar to the older male results, UI
benefits are seen to inffuence both the
" In this sample, and those of the following sections,
a few individuals were unemployed in more than one
year. The inclusion of these repeaters introduces some
correlation of residuals across equations. However,
experiments indicated that excluding these repeaters
yielded virtually identical results. These data also did
not permit us to identify voluntary and involuntary
separations.
™ Actually the dependent variables were 14 log
(Ww/Wm) and J^ log (Wi./Ww), respectively, so
as to capture annual growth rates. Wm was used as
a proxy for Wm, which was not reported in the mail
survey of 1968.
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TABLE 2—NLS FEMALE SAMPLE"
(absolute value i = statistics)
F
AGE
RACE
MARRIE
PSURAT
PSUPOP"
FEMDEM
DEPEND
RELLFP
RELDUM
HEALTH
EDUC
ASSETS"
ASSDUM
LPRWGE
68-69
69-71
PERCPY"
NREPY
Constant
R'
n
All
D
0.371
(2.5)
0.021
(1.7)
-0.235
(2.0)
-0.075
(0.6)
0.036
(1.3)
0.087
(1.8)
0.020
(1.8)
0.021
(0.7)
-0.516
(2.8)
0.012
(0.6)
0.236
(1.5)
-0.029
(1.4)
0.001
(0.1)
0.027
(2.0)
-0.012
(0.1)
-0.073
(0.5)
0.332
(2.5)
0.047
(0.8)
0.144
(1.0)
0.357
(0.5)
0.13
441
1968-69;69-71
D
0.295
(1.7)
0.006
(0.3)
-0.003
(1.7)
-0.288
(1.7)
0.037
(1.1)
0.082
(1.2)
0.021
(1.4)
0.074
(1.7)
-0.301
(1.2)
-0.042
(0.2)
0.383
(1.8)
-0.052
(1.7)
0.001
(0.1)
-0.043
(0.2)
-0.088
(0.5)
0.461
(2.8)
0.086
(1.1)
0.535
(2.6)
0.743
(0.8)
0.15
253
Sample
W
0.120
(4.4)
-0.006
(2.3)
-0.013
(0.5)
0.015
(0.6)
0.004
(0.7)
0.025
(2.2)
-0.567
(0.2)
-0.010
(1.4)
0.021
(0.6)
0.094
(2.3)
0.098
(2.9)
0.009
(2.0)
0.004
(2.0)
0.053
(1.9)
-0.242
(8.5)
-0.028
(1.1)
-0.020
(1.6)
-0.090
(2.8)
0.346
(2.2)
0.37
253
1968-69; 70-71
Change
D
0.428
(2.0)
-0.009
(0.4)
-0.036
(0.2)
-0.412
(1.8)
0.036
(0.7)
0.113
(1.1)
0.028
(1.3)
0.066
(1.0)
-0.398
(1.2)
-0.037
(0.1)
0.072
(0.2)
-0.062
(1.5)
-0.004
(0.2)
-0.046
(0.2)
-0.211
(0.9)
0.414
(1.8)
0.111
(1.1)
0.513
(1.9)
1.375
(1.1)
0.16
156
Employer Sample
W
0.145
(4.2)
-0.009
(2.6)
-0.006
(0.2)
0.031
(0.8)
0.004
(0.4)
0.038
(2.2)
-0.240
(0.1)
-0.011
(1.1)
0.025
(0.5)
0.055
(0.9)
0.072
(1.4)
0.009
(1.3)
0.006
(2.1)
0.051
(1.3)
-0.292
(7.6)
-0.064
(1.7)
0.022
(1.3)
-0.092
(2.0)
0.484
(2.2)
0.44
156
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions.
» X>=duration equation; W = wage change equation,
b Variable/1000.
average duration of spell of unemployment
and average postunemployment wage for
this cohort. However, the magnitude of
these relationships is somewhat smaller.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the replace-
ment ratio (F) from .4 to .5 would increase
the average duration of unemployment by
0.3 weeks and the expected gain in post-
unemployment wages by about 1.5 per-
cent.^ ^ Moreover, restricting the sample to
'"This calculation is for the 1968-69, 1969-7!
sample and utilizes the formula specified in fn. 17.
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those whom we know changed employers
does not markedly alter these results.
Additional analyses not reported here
indicate a similar pattern of results when
the data are analyzed separately by year.^^
Restriction to a sample of UI recipients
did not provide a large enough sample size
for us to obtain significant coefficient esti-
mates.^' The data also failed to indicate
that the impact of UI benefits on job
search varied significantly with either
marital status or the level of other family
members' income.^ ^ Additionally, equa-
tions were also estimated with the indi-
viduals' average duration of spell out of
the labor force as a dependent variable.^^
In the main the coefficient of the replace-
ment fraction variable proved insignificant
in the various samples; however, it was
negative and significant in the 1966-67
sample. For that period, ceteris paribus, an
increase in F from .4 to .5 would decrease
the average duration out of the labor force
by 0.7 weeks. Apparently for this cohort
of women, in 1966-67 there was a tendency
to substitute unemployment status for out
of labor force status as UI benefits rose.
V. Empirical Results—Younger Males
Surveys for this cohort were conducted
annually during the 1966-69 period. We
divided the span of the survey into three
two-year periods: 1966-67; 1967-68; 1968-
69. An individual was included in our sam-
ple for a period if he a) was an employed
wage or salary worker and reported his
wage at both survey dates, b) was un-
employed sometime during the interim,
"See the authors.
^ Approximately 25 percent of these women were
UI recipients with a mean F of over .5 for the
recipients.
"^We are indebted to a referee for suggesting that
these hypotheses be tested. Married women did appear
to have a lower F coefficient than single women, but
the difference was statistically insignificant.
" Our calculation of duration of spell out of labor
force assumed that a temporary withdrawal occurred
after each spell of unemployment.
c) reported his number of spells of un-
employment, and d) changed employers
between survey dates.^^ The three samples
were then pooled together to create one
overall sample of 464 observations.
Equations similar to (4a) and (4b) were
estimated with the dependent variable in
(4b) being the logarithm of the ratio of the
wage rates at the two survey dates. The
control variables used were again different
from those used in the previous sections
because of the different nature of the sam-
ples. Table 3 presents estimates of these
equations for the entire sample, a sub-
sample of individuals who were not in
school during the period, and a subsample
of heads of households.
In contrast to the previous results, UI
benefits are seen to infiuence the average
duration of spell of unemployment but noi
the postunemployment wage for young
males in the sample. Ceteris paribus, an in-
crease in F from .4 to .5 would increase the
average duration of spell in the sample by
0.2 weeks; substantially less than the im-
pact observed in the older male sample."
These results suggest that for younger
males, increasing UI benefits would serve
only to subsidize either unproductive job
search or increased leisure time.
Several extensions of the analysis re-
ported here were conducted, however none
altered our basic conclusion.^* One exten-
sion was to pool all four-year's data for
each individual and to use logit analysis to
estimate the determinants of an individu-
al's probabilities of entering and leaving
unemployment during the period. While
an increase in the level of UI benefits de-
creases the probability of leaving unem-
ployment (hence increases the expected
- 'The latter restriction allowed us to eliminate
temporary layoffs from the sample. However, again
the data did not permit us to identify voluntary and
involuntary separations.
"This estimate is based upon the overall sample
coefficients and the mean values of the variables.
'"See the authors for details.
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TABLE 3—NLS YOUNGER MALE SAMPLE: CHANGE EMPLOYEES'
(absolute value <-statistics)
F
AGE
RACE
MARRIE
PSURAT
PSUPOP"
TENURE
HEALTH
EDUC
KNOWRK
ASSETS"
ASSDUM
67-68
68-69
LPRWGE
Constant
n
D
0.538
(2.1)
0.003
(0.2)
-0.074
(0.8)
-0.252
(2.1)
0.060
(1.9)
0.000
(0.0)
-0.036
(0.9)
-0.125
(1.0)
-0.057
(2.4)
0.002
(0.3)
-0.022
(0.7)
-0.045
(0.3)
0.065
(0.6)
-0.029
(0.3)
0.111
(1.1)
1.625
(3.8)
0.05
464
All
W
0.093
(0.9)
0.021
(2.6)
0.040
(1.1)
0.064
(1.3)
0.010
(0.8)
0.017
(1.4)
-0.002
(0.1)
-0.028
(0.5)
0.029
(3.1)
0.004
(1.7)
0.009
(0.8)
-0.110
(1.6)
0.046
(1.1)
0.288
(6.8)
-0.749
(18.3)
-0.326
(1.9)
0.46
464
Not in School
D
0.653
(2.4)
0.024
(0.9)
-0.152
(1.3)
-0.268
(2.1)
0.097
(2.5)
0.021
(0.5)
-0.075
(1.4)
-0.140
(0.9)
-0.052
(1.9)
-0.003
(0.3)
0.010
(0.2)
-0.092
(0.4)
0.243
(1.6)
-0.013
(0.1)
0.177
(1.3)
1.158
(2.0)
0.10
292
W
0.081
(0.8)
0.010
(1.1)
0.074
(1.7)
0.067
(1.5)
0.024
(1.7)
0.014
(1.0)
-0.005
(0.3)
-0.096
(1.8)
0.030
(3.0)
0.003
(0.9)
-0.006
(0.3)
-0.014
(0.2)
0.135
(2.4)
0.226
(4.5)
-0.676
(13.56)
-0.260
(1.3)
0.42
292
Head of
D
0.927
(2.0)
0.052
(1.1)
-0.395
(1.7)
-0.163
(0.6)
-0.003
(0.1)
-0.047
(0.7)
-0.126
(1.8)
-0.100
(0.4)
0.005
(0.1)
-0.013
(0.9)
-0.006
(0.1)
0.041
(0.1)
0.257
(0.8)
0.108
(0.5)
0.060
(0.3)
0.829
(0.7)
0.14
111
Household
W
0.085
(0.5)
-0.001
(0.0)
-0.060
(0.7)
0.070
(0.7)
0.007
(0.3)
0.042
(1.6)
0.015
(0.6)
-0.095
(1.1)
0.024
(1.4)
-0.957
(0.2)
-0.012
(0.6)
-0.132
(1.1)
-0.118
(1.1)
0.089
(1.2)
-0.601
(7.2)
0.408
(1.0)
0.44
111
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions.
» £)=duration equation; H' = wage change equation.
" Variable/1000
duration of unemployment), it has no im-
pact on the probability of entering un-
employment. Thus, we have no evidence
that high UI benefits induce young males
to quit their jobs. A second extension was
to reestimate the reported equations for a
restricted sample of 89 younger males who
received UI benefits. Although the rela-
tively small sample sizes caused the co-
efficients of the replacement fraction F to
be statistically insignificant, the magni-
tudes of these coefficients were very similar
to those reported in the first two columns
of Table 3. Finally, attempts were made
to estimate duration out of the labor force
equations but these results proved incon-
clusive. Hence, for this group, there is no
evidence that as F rises, a substitution of
unemployment for out of labor force status
occurs.
VI. Empirical Results—Younger Females
Surveys available to us for this final co-
hort were conducted annually in 1968,
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TABLE 4—iVI5 YOUNGER FEMALE SAMPLE'
(absolute value ^-statistics)
F
AGE
RACE
MARRIE
PSURAT
PSUPOP^
FEMDEM
HEALTH
LPRWGE
HUSBY^
DEPEND
EDUC
KNOWRK
ASSETS^
NASSDM
67-68
68-69
Constant
iJ»
n
D
1.222
(3.8)
0.027
(1.3)
-0,206
(2.2)
0,036
(0,3)
0,007
(0.3)
-0,788
(2,2)
-0,004
(0,4)
-0,033
(0,2)
-0,110
(1,5)
-0,433
(1.8)
0,010
(1.8)
0,007
(0,3)
-0,015
(0,7)
-0,092
(0,5)
-0,215
(1,4)
,698
(7,1)
0,540
(5,0)
0,521
(1,0)
.17
613
AU
W
0,041
(0,4)
0,012
(1,9)
0,034
(1.1)
-0,007
(0,1)
0,005
(0,6)
0,607
(5.1)
-0,008
(2,2)
-0,057
(0,9)
-0,707
(28,9)
0,035
(0,4)
-0,002
(0,1)
0,054
(6,6)
0,005
(0,8)
0,014
(0,2)
-0,020
(0,4)
-0,096
(3,0)
-0,046
(1,3)
-0,249
(1,4)
,60
613
0
-8,002
(2,1)
-1,046
(4.5)
0,702
(0,7)
0,064
(0.0)
-0,268
(1,0)
1.744
(0,4)
0,146
(1.2)
5,518
(2,2)
-0,486
(0,6)
2,800
(1.0)
0,857
(1,4)
0,434
(1.5)
0.016
(0.1)
-0,746
(0,3)
2,670
(1.6)
7,772
(6,9)
0,574
(0,5)
12,501
(2,0)
,19
613
Not in School
D
1,221
(3.8)
0,038
(1.7)
-0.226
(2.3)
0.017
(0,1)
-0,005
(0,2)
-0,849
(2,1)
-0,007
(0,6)
0,023
(0.1)
-0,124
(1.4)
-0,326
(1,3)
0,121
(2.1)
0.014
(0,5)
-0,015
(0.6)
-0.082
(0,4)
-0,304
(1,8)
0,726
(6,8)
0,488
(4.3)
0,417
(0.7)
.19
507
W
0,039
(0.4)
-0,001
(0.2)
0,056
(1.8)
-0,031
(0.7)
6,003
(0,4)
0,570
(4,5)
-0,008
(2.3)
-0,083
(1.2)
-0,725
(25,9)
0,052
(0,7)
0,004
(0,2)
0,046
(5.4)
0.010
(1.3)
0.021
(0,4)
-0,022
(0,4)
-0,083
(2.5)
-0,013
(0.4)
0.129
(0,7)
,60
507
0
-8.379
(2.2)
-0,991
(3,8)
0,639
(0,6)
0,182
(0.1)
-0,143
(0.5)
0,546
(0.1)
0.170
(1.3)
5,590
(2,2)
-0,098
(0,1)
2,197
(0.8)
0,951
(1,4)
0,665
(2,1)
-0,096
(0,3)
-0,716
(0,3)
0,191
(1.0)
7,733
(6,3)
0,970
(0,7)
8.811
(1.2)
,18
507
Self or Spouse
Head of Household
D
1.499
(3,6)
0,021
(0.7)
-0,218
(1.5)
0.144
(0.8)
0,013
(0,4)
-0,399
(0.7)
-0,023
(1.3)
0,116
(0,4)
-0,013
(0.1)
-0,529
(2.0)
0,144
(2.3)
0,017
(0,5)
-0,017
(0,5)
-0,022
(0,1)
-0,240
(1.1)
0,681
(5.0)
0,571
(3,9)
0,940
(1.1)
,21
293
W
-0.053
(0.4)
0,008
(0.8)
0,037
(0,8)
-0,033
(0.6)
0.011
(1.1)
0.744
(4,2)
-0,011
(2.1)
0,082
(0.9)
-0,711
(19.8)
0,014
(0,2)
-0,011
(0.6)
0,042
(4,0)
"0,914
(0.0) .
0,032
(0.5)
-0,043
(0,6)
-0,097
(2,3)
-0,013
(0,3)
0,168
(0,7)
,61
293
0
-7,075
(1.6)
-0,685
(2.2)
2.889
(1.9)
1.456
(0,8)
-0,522
(1.6)
5,174
(0.8)
0,253
(1,4)
2,436
(0.8)
-0,588
(0,5)
3,212
(1.2)
1,060
(1,6)
0.771
(2.2)
-0,767
, (2.2)
-0,520
(0,3)
3,741
(1,6)
6,873
(4,8)
-1,051
(0.7)
0,227
(0.0)
.20
293
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions,
' />=duration equation; W' = wage change equation; 0 =
^ Variable/1000.
duration out of labor force equation.
1969, and 1970, and retrospective ques-
tions at the 1968 survey date enabled us to
ascertain the individual's employment
status a year prior to the 1968 survey date
(1967) and to estimate her wage at that
time. Again, we divided the span of these
surveys into three two-year periods: 1967-
68; 1968-69; 1969-70. Individuals were
included in our sample for a period if they
met the criteria listed in the previous sec-
tion, save that we did not require that they
changed employers.^ Pooling the three
™ This restriction was not imposed because we could
not measure whether individuals changed employers
during the 1967-68 period. To impose it would have
cut our sample size by over 50 percent.
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samples together yielded an overall sample
of 613 individuals.
Equations virtually identical to those
estimated for the younger males in terms
of the control variables were then esti-
mated for this overall sample, a subsample
of individuals who were not in school
during the period, and a subsample of
heads (or spouses of heads) of households.
These results as well as our estimates of
duration out of labor force equations are
found in Table 4.
Quite strikingly, we observe that the
estimated impact of UI benefits on dura-
tion of unemployment and postunemploy-
ment wages is virtually identical to those
reported for the younger male sample, with
a small impact on duration but no signifi-
cant impact on expected postunemploy-
ment wages. Ceteris paribus, an increase in
F from .4 to .5 would increase the average
duration of spell of unemployment by 0.5
weeks.'" In contrast to the younger male
results though, we observe a large impact
of UI benefits on the duration of spell out
of the labor force, with a ceteris paribus
increase in F from .4 to .5 yielding a de-
crease in duration out of the labor force of
.8 weeks. Thus, for this group, raising UI
benefits would appear to induce a substi-
tution of unemployment for out of labor
force status.
Additional results not presented here
tend to confirm these conclusions.'^ Similar
patterns of UI impacts are found for each
individual year's subsample of data. Fur-
thermore, estimates based upon a small
restricted subsample of individuals who all
received UI benefits indicate even larger
impacts for UI benefit changes on duration
of spell of unemployment and duration of
spell out of the labor force.
*'This estimate and the one that follows is based
upon the coefficient estimate in column 1. See fn. 17
for the formula used.
"See the authors for details.
VII. Policy Implications and Concluding
Remarks
Our results are summarized in Table 5
in which, for each of the four cohorts, we
calculate the estimated impact of un-
employment insurance benefit changes on
unemployed individuals' duration of un-
employment, postunemployment wages,
and durations of spell out of the labor
force. Three estimates are presented for
each group: 1) the impact of the current
benefit level relative to the absence of
benefits; 2) the impact of increasing the
replacement fraction from 0.4 to 0.5 (which
we have already discussed); and 3) the
impact of increasing the replacement frac-
tion from 0.0 to 1.0.'^  We caution the
reader, however, that in the latter cases
we are extrapolating far outside of the
range of the sample data and hence these
numbers should be interpreted with care.
Strictly speaking, the results are not
comparable across groups as different re-
strictions have been placed on the various
cohort samples. They do seem to indicate,
however, that an increase in UI benefits
would induce additional productive job
search for both the subsamples of older
males and females, with the magnitudes
of the impacts on both postunemployment
wages and duration of unemployment
being larger for the male sample.'' In con-
trast, an increase in UI benefits appears
to increase the duration of unemployment
for both the younger male and female
" The formulae used to calculate the first and third
types of impacts are analogous to those presented in fn.
17 and are derived in the appendix which is available
from the authors. Note that because many individuals
in these samples received no UI benefits, the "current
average replacement ratio" is extremely low. Indeed,
for the four samples (in the order they were reported
in the text), the mean values of F are .13, .18, .07,
and .03.
"Recall that the older male impacts refer only to
those men who were laid off and changed employers.
The impact of UI benefits on job search were in-
significant for those who were on temporary layoff or
who voluntarily left their previous job.
VOL. 66 NO. S EHRENBERG AND OAXACA: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 76S
TABIX S—ESTIMATED IMPACT OF UI BENEEIT CHANGES ON DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT,
POSTUNEMPLOYMENT WAGES, AND DURATION OF SPELL OUT OF THE LABOR FORCE"
Impact of Current Benefit
Levels Relative to
the Absence of
Benefits
M W B G
Impact of Increasing
the Replacement
Fraction From
0.4 to 0.5
M W B G
Impact of Increasing
the Replacement
Fraction From
0.0 to 1.0
M W B
Change in Duration of
Unemployment (Weeks)
Annual Percentage
Wage Change
Change in Duration Out of
the Labor Force (Weeks)
1.0 0.4 0.1 0.1
9.0 2.5
-0.2
1.5 0.3 0.2 0.5
7.0 1.5 °
b _o.7ci c - 0 . 8
18.8 2.7 2.5 6.0
97.3 16.1 ' '
" M = older male sample: layoff/changed employers, 1 spell only subsample
W = female sample: 1968-69, 1969-71, changed employers subsample
B = younger male sample: changed employers subsample
G = younger female sample: entire sample
'' Equation not estimated.
" Underlying regression coefficient was statistically insignificant.
•^  Impacts for 1967 subsample, coefficient for W sample was statistically insignificant.
samples but has no impact on their post-
unemployment wages. Whether this im-
plies that these groups' job search is
unproductive or that they are using UI
benefits to subsidize leisure cannot be as-
certained unambiguously from the data.'^
For younger females, there is some evi-
dence that the latter hypothesis is correct,
as it appears that UI benefits may induce
a substitution of "unemployment status"
for "out of labor force status."
The limitations of our analysis make it
difficult to draw policy conclusions for
several reasons. First, the NLS data did
not sample prime age males, 24-45, nor
females, ages 25-29, or 45 and above.'^
This makes it impossible for us to draw
any conclusions as to the system's overall
** An alternative explanation for these results is that
younger recipients of UI benefits may search for jobs
offering better opportunities for on-the-job training.
To the extent that this is true, we would expect them
to accept jobs with low postunemployment wages
because of the investment options offered. Conse-
quently, our concentration on postunemployment
wages may be myopic and their returns to search
would more appropriately be measured by examining
changes in their lifetime earnings streams. Unfortu-
nately, the data do not permit us to test this hypothesis.
impact on job search behavior. Second, by
restricting the analysis to individuals who
were employed at both survey dates, which
was necessary in order to obtain pre- and
postunemployment wage data, we have
prevented ourselves from estimating the
impact of UI benefits on the probability
that individuals will drop "permanently"
out of the labor force. Third, we have no
evidence as to how employers react to the
infiuence of higher UI benefits on un-
employed workers' job search. Nor do we
know whether the increased earnings of
those individuals who receive higher bene-
fits are offset by lower earnings for those
with lower or no benefits (i.e., displace-
ment effects). Finally, we have provided
no information as to whether UI benefits
influence the willingness of individuals to
remain on temporary layoff and to accept
jobs which offer frequent spells of un-
employment.'* Nevertheless, because of
the subgroups of the sample we have
''Actually, the omitted age groups are smaller, as
men age 24 in 1966 were 27 by the 1969 survey and
women age 24(44) in 1968(1967) were 27(48) by the
1970 survey date.
"See Feldstein (197S).
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found that apparently would not engage
in additional productive Job search, it is
unlikely that one could justify raising UI
benefit levels on efficiency grounds. Rather,
equity and income maintenance considera-
tions would appear to be the necessary
basis for such actions.^'
"See Feldstein (1974) and Gary Fields for discus-
sions relating to equity and income maintenance con-
siderations and the current impact of the UI system
on the personal distribution of income,
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